Cơ chế quản trị doanh nghiệp và chất lượng kiểm toán: Trường hợp Việt Nam

This study aims to analyze the relationships between corporate-governance

mechanisms and audit quality of Vietnam listed firms. Based on a sample of 221 listed

firms collected from FiinPro database, annual reports, financial statements and corporate

governance reports from 2015 to 2017, this study examines the use of Big 4 auditors as a

proxy to measure audit quality and applies the logistic regression method to analyse these

relationships. The empirical results show that the use of Big 4 auditors is significantly

positively related to corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. the proportion of independent

directors in the board of directors, controlling shareholding and foreign investor equity).

Thus, the findings support the perspective claiming that improved control mechanisms will

lead to higher audit quality. The study has a number of practical implications for

managers and the Vietnam Government in terms of enhancing corporate governance

effectiveness and audit quality. This study also adds to the limited number of empirical

studies on audit quality of listed firms in Vietnam.

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s study support Decree No. 71/2017 / ND-CP of Vietnam government which requires that "The composition of the of a listed BoD must ensure that at least 1/3 of the members of the BoD are independent members" (Section 5, Article 13). In this study, however, 5% of the sample of 221 listed firms still have the ratio of independent members lower than one third, thus the stock regulators need strictly provide the surveillance of listed firms to ensure them point enough independent member in the BoD. Second, the study does not support the association between the duality between CEO and chairman of the BoD and audit quality, suggesting that the duality is not a poor control mechanism in Vietnam listed firms. Therefore, Vietnam government does not need to have the policy on the separation between the two positions in the listed firms. Third, the study does not find a relationship between state ownership and audit quality. Thus, the finding does not support the findings of prior studies (Guedhami et al., 2009; Alfraih, 2017; Wang et al., 2008) which found that state owners in other countries prefer selecting low-quality auditors to protect their political interests at state firms. In the case of Vietnam listed firms, state owners do not play a significant role in the decision of choosing auditors. Indeed, Vietnam government monitors its equity in listed firms via state representatives and Circular No. 21/2014 / TT-BTC of the Ministry of Finance (2014) also promulgated the regulation on the operation of authorized representatives for state capital invested in enterprises. However, the question of whether the representatives effectively protect the interest of government is still a critical issue in 875 practice that needs an effective policy to improve their role at listed firms (Tran Van Binh and Nguyen Thanh Huong, 2017). Fourth, in 2017, foreign capital inflows into the Vietnam stock market increased dramatically with the value of the foreign direct investment by the end of December 2017 reached USA$ 32.9 billion, an increase of over 90% compared to the end of 2016. This is attracting a great interest of foreign investors in the stock market of Vietnam. However, foreign investors are still not fully familiar with the investment environment in the Vietnam stock market such as legal framework, corporate governance and internal business issues (Financial Magazine, 2018). The findings of this study show a positive association between audit quality and foreign equity holding, suggesting that listed firms need to choose high-quality auditors to attract foreign shareholders. This is because these shareholders often claim that the financial statements and the performance of the company audited by high-quality auditors are more reliable (Jiang and Kim, 2004). Finally, the findings also suggest that a firm with larger controlling shareholders is more likely to choose high-quality auditors. In other words, with a larger size of shareholding, the controlling shareholders can more effectively monitor the behaviour of managers. Thus, this is a signal for information users to analyse which companies have more effective control mechanisms. Although this study has a number of contributions to both theory and practice, there are still some limitations. Future studies should extend the sample to measure for all companies listed on the stock exchange of Vietnam. In addition, the use of a binary variable of the Big 4 auditors to measure audit quality still has some limitations, therefore future studies should combine with different proxies to measure audit quality. Finally, further research should examine other elements of the governance mechanism (control committee, other ownerships such as group owners, financial owners...) and other elements of the audit firms (auditing capacity professional ethics, audit methods, auditing support systems...) may affect audit quality of listed firms. Overall, this study has examined the relationship between audit quality and corporate-governance mechanisms of Vietnam listed firms. The empirical results support three out of five hypotheses used to test the research model. Firms with higher independent member ratios, higher foreign shareholdings, and larger controlling owners have more incentive to choose high-quality auditors. This study has a significant contribution to the literature on audit quality and corporate governance, and managerial practices. EFERENCES 1. Abdullah, W.Z.W., Ismail S. and Jamaluddin N. 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